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INDUSTRIAL COURTS
INDUSTRIAL COURTS:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE. KANSAS EXPERIMENT'
By J. S. YOUNG*
T HE act creating the court of industrial relations fairly
bristles with constitutional questions and will have to run
the gauntlet of the courts from the district and supreme courts of
Kansas to the Supreme Court of the United States.
V. THE ACT CREATING THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND THE KANSAS CONSTITUTION.
1. The Power of the Governor to Call a Special Session of the
Legislature. Counsel for defendants in Kansas v. Howat2
attacked the validity of the act on the ground that it was passed
at a special session of the legislature which Governor Allen had
no authority to call for the reason that no extraordinary occasion
existed in the state at the time. This contention the court denied
following an earlier decision by the same court. In that case,
Farrelly v. Cole,3 Governor Leedy of Kansas called a special
session of the legislature nineteen days before the time for the
regular session. Article 1, sec. 3 of the constitution reads as
follows: "The supreme executive power of the state shall be
vested in the governor who shall see that the laws are faithfully
executed," and sec. 5 of the same article states: "He may on
extraordinary occasions convene the legislature by proclama-
tion." Governor Leedy's proclamation convening the legislature
reads as follows:
"Whereas assurances have reached me to the effect that if
the legislature be convened, suitable legislation for the regulation
of railway charges can be enacted and deeming such matter of
sufficient importance to justify the convening of the legislature
in special session, now therefore, I, by virtue of authority in me
vested by the constitution of the state, do convene."
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'Continued from Vol. 4, MINNESOTA LAw REmwE 483.2 Briefs were submitted by Messrs. P. H. Callery of Pittsburg, Kan-
sas and Redmond S. Brennan, Kansas City, Missouri, (1920) 107 Kan.
423, 191 Pac. 585.
3(1899) 60 Kan. 356, 56 Pac. 492, 44 L. R. A. 464.
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The legislature assembled and Governor Leedy delivered a
message setting forth his reasons for calling the special session.
The legislature passed an act regulating railway charges, which
was contested by the railroads on the ground that no extraor-
dinary occasion existed within the meaning of the constitution
to justify the calling of tfie special session that had enacted the
offending law.
It will be noticed that the Governor's proclamation does not
recite that an extraordinary occasion existed, but it does state:
"I, . . . by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
constitution of the state, do hereby convene the legislature of the
state of Kansas."
The court pointed out that the governor had no power to call
a special session except on extraordinary occasions and that the
language of the proclamation by its reference to the constitution
made it certain that an extraordinary occasion was meant. Gov-
ernor Leedy's proclamation is less defective than the form used
by the early presidents of the United States.4
The railway companies contended that the reasons assigned
by Governor Leedy in his messages to the special session clearly
showed that no extraordinary occasion existed, in short, they
attacked the discretion of the governor. The court followed the
decisions of other courts in a few leading cases. In Marbury v.
Madison5 the Supreme Court by Marshall said:
"He, the president, is to use his own discretion and is account-
able only to his country in his political character and to his own
conscience, and whatever opinion may be entertained of the man-
ner in which the executive discretion may be used, still there
exists no power to control that discretion. The subject is
political."
4The clause in the Kansas constitution providing for the calling an
extra session of the legislature was adopted from a similar provision in
the constitution of the United States (Art. 2, Sec. 3) which reads: "He,(the president) may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses
(of Congress) or either of them." The first proclamation of President
Washington calling an extra session of the Senate is dated March 1,
1791 and does not mention an extraordinary occasion. It reads: "Cer-
tain matters touching the public good requiring that the Senate shall be
convened." 1 Mess. & Papers of Pres. 587.
This form was followed until Tyler introduced the following: "Ob-jects interesting to the United States requiring that the Senate should
be in session," etc. Beginning with Fillmore, all presidents have -recit-
ed an extraordinary occasion in the proclamation calling a special session
of either the Senate or the Congress.
5(1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
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In United States v. Arredondo6 the Supreme Court discuss-
ing discretion said:
"It is a universal principle that when power or jurisdiction is
delegated any public officer or tribunal over a subject-matter
and its exercise is confined to his or their discretion, the acts
so done are binding and valid as to the subject-matter."
The highest court in New York in the case of Judges, etc., v.
People7 ex rel. Savage defined discretion to be:
"A power of right conferred upon them by law of acting offi-
cially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their
own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others."
Touching the uncontrolled power of the governor to call a
special session of the legislature, the supreme court of Delaware
in the case of Whiteman's executors v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co.,
said:
"The governor is authorized to convene the general assem-
bly on extraordinary occasions. The framers of the constitution
have not defined what should be deemed an extraordinary occa-
sion for this purpose nor referred the settlement of the question
to any other department or branch of the gorvernment. The gov-
ernor must necessarily be the judge or he cannot exercise the
power. He may err but this court has no jurisdiction to review
his decision'or to correct his error. If he act corruptly, he is
liable to impeachment."
In passing on the same point the supreme court of Colorado
in Veto Power" said:
"Whether or not an occasion exists of such extraordinary
character as demands a convention of the general assembly in
special session . . . is a matter resting entirely in the judg-
ment of the executive."
The same conclusion was reached by the New York supreme
court in People ex rel Catter v. Rice.10 The Kansas supreme
court after citing with approval the cases listed above, concluded
that there can be no fixed or uniform definition of an extraor-
dinary occasion. The court concluded :11
"The sole power is. thus deposited in the governor to con-
vene the legislature on extraordinary occasions and it has been
uniformly held that he cannot be compelled by mandamus to act,
6(1832) 6 Pet. 729, 8 L. Ed. 547.
7(1837) 18 Wend. 99.
8(1839) 2 Harr. (Del.) 514, 33 Am. Dec. 411.
9(1886) 9 Colo. 642, 21 Pac. 477.
-0(1892) 65 Hun 236, 20 N. Y. S. 293, 47 N. Y. St. Rep. 685.
"Farrelly v. Cole, 60 Kan. 356, 56 Pac. 492, 44 L. R. A. 464.
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should he refuse for any reason to exercise the power, nor be
restrained by injunction in an attempt to exercise it."
2. The Title of the Act and Revival.of a Law by Amendment.
The Kansas constitution provides :12
"No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be
clearly expressed in its title, and no law shall be revived or
amended unless the new act contain the entire act revived, or the
section or sections amended, and the section or sections so
amended shall be repealed."
The title of the act is as follows :'1
"An act creating the court of industrial relations, defining
its powers and duties, and relating thereto, abolishing the public
utilities commission, repealing all acts and parts of acts in con-
flict therewith, and providing penalties for the violation of this
act."
The constitutionality of the act has been challenged because
of defective title by counsel for defendants in two important
cases 4 that have been before the Kansas courts recently. In
the Jerry Scott case (district court), which involved the crim-
inal provisions of the act (Laws of 1920, Chap. 29, Sec. 17)
counsel for the defendant contended that the title does not define
the subjects embodied in the act; that the title does not clearly
express all that is included in the act; that it violates the con-
stitutional requirement of unity by embodying a multiplicity of
subjects. Among these numerous subjects may be mentioned:
(1) transferring the power and duties formerly controlled by the
public utilities commission; (2) affecting with a public interest
certain employments, industries and public utilities and common
carriers; (3) giving power to the court of industrial relations to
make rules and regulations to govern its own procedure; (4)
giving power to the court of industrial relations to make rules
controlling the acts and conduct of employees; (5) authorizing
investigation of conditions, surroundings and housing of em-
ployees; (6) establishing of a minimum wage; (7) determination
of law as to misdemeanors and felonies.
The district court of Wyandotte County, by Justice McCam-
ish, reviewed several cases in which the supreme court of Kan-
sas had the titles of the acts under consideration. In Swayze
12Art. 2, Sec. 16.
13Kansas Laws, 1920, C. 29.
14(1920) Kansas v. Jerry Scott, District Court of Wyandotte County,
printed transcript of decision and brief by Messrs. James A. Smith,
Harry Sullivan & Henry Dean. Kansas v. Alexander Howat et al., (Kan.
1920) 191 Pac. 585.
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v. Britton15 the court held that the title, "An act concerning
notaries public" does not include a section providing for the
service of protest on a negotiable instrument by a notary public
because this was not part of his duty under the law merchant; in
M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Long,16 the title, "An act to require rail-
road companies to make cattle guards and to pay damages that
individuals may sustain," does not cover a provision for making
crossings; in State v. Barrett," the title, "An act to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors" is not broad enough
to cover a section punishing intoxication of persons; in Wilker-
son v. Belknap Savings Bank,18 the title, "An act to regulate the
sale of real estate under execution . . . and repealing cer-
tain sections of General Statutes, 1889," does not admit a sec-
tion "In any case where the property is bid in by or for the prior
creditor the sheriff shall receive the fees for the sale, but shall
not be entitled to charge any commission on said sale" as not
germane to the title; in Topeka v. Wood,19 the title, "An act
relating to cities of the first class and providing for appeals from
the police court of such cities in certain cases," does not sustain
a provision for further appeal from the district court to the
supreme court; in Winfield v. Hackney,20 the title, "An ordinance
in relation to the registration of dogs in the city of Winfield and
providing a penalty," does not cover a section providing that
"at the time of registration the owner shall pay a sum of money
to the city clerk or dog tax collector" because it is not expressed
in the title; in Clark v. Wallace County Commissioners,2
1 the
title, "An act to protect fruit trees, hedge plants and fences," does
not embrace a section providing for the payment of a bounty on
gopher scalps.
The information charged Jerry Scott with an offense under
the proviso contained in sec. 17, chap. 29, Laws of 1920. -22 It
' (1879) 17 Kan. 625, Brewer, J., dissenting.
16(1882) 27 Kan. 684.
17(1882) 27 Kan. 213.
18(1894) 52 Kan. 718, 35 Pac. 792.
19(1901) 62 Kan. 809, 64 Pac. 630.20 (1912) 87 Kan. 858, 126 Pac. 1088.
21(1895) 54 Kan. 634, 39 Pac. 225.
22"Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed as restrict-
ing the right of any individual employee engaged in the operation of any
such industry, employment, public utility, or common carrier to quit his
employment at 2ny time, but it shall be unlawful for an such individual
employee or other person to conspire with other persons to quit their
employment or to induce other persons to quit their employ-
ment for the purpose of hindering, delaying, interfering with, or
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was claimed that the proviso violates sec. 16, art. 2 of the Kan-
sas constitution in that the subject of the section is neither clearly
expressed in the title to the act, nor germane to what is expressed.
Touching this point the court said :23
"The real subject of the act was to abolish the old public
utilities commission and to confer the powers of the old on a
new board which the statute creates and to enlarge the powers
heretofore exercised in the matter of settling industrial disputes."
"It is difficult to see," remarked the court, "how the subject as
expressed in the title will support an act to define and punish
certain misdemeanors not relating to the subject. Reading the
title to the effect that a court is to be established, does not warn
the reader that new statutory offenses in no way affecting the
powers and duties of the court, are to be defined and punished;
or that the law of conspiracy to prevent the continuous opera-
tion of railroads is to be annulled or amended."
The court, therefore, ruled that the proviso of sec. 17 violates
sec. 16 of art. 2 of the state constitution.
Counsel for Howat et al. in the supreme court challenged the
constitutionality of the act among other reasons because (1) it
contains more than one subject and the subjects are not clearly
expressed in the title. It was contended that the title of the act
is, a court of industrial relations, but the body of the act clearly
shows that the legislature intended to create an agency of the
legislature and not a court as a part of the judiciary; therefore,
the real subject of the act is not only not clearly ex'pressed in
the title, but is not expressed at all; the term "court" should be
used in its ordinary and legal meaning to be a "judicial assem-
bly" or "a place where justice is judicially administered." (2)
The act expressly abolishes the public utilities commission, con-
fers its former powers upon the new court of industrial rela-
tions and seeks to reEnact all the statutes dealing with the former
commission.2 4  This, it was argued, clearly conflicts with sec. 16,
suspending the operation of any of the industries, employments, public
utilities, or common carriers governed by the provisions of this act, or
for any person to engage in what is known as 'picketing;' or to intimi-
date by threats, abuse, or in any other manner, any person or persons
with intent to induce such person or persons to quit such employment,
or for the purpose of deterring or preventing any other person or per-
sons from accepting employment or from remaining in the employ of any
of the industries, employments, public utilities, or common carriers gov-
erned by the provisions of this act." Laws 1920, c. 29, Sec. 17.23State v. Jerry Scott, see note 14.24Laws 1920, c. 29, Sec. 2 confers upon the court of industrial rela-
tions the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the public utilities commis-
sion; the court is given jurisdiction to supervise and control all public
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art. 2 of the constitution which requires the sections so amended
to be reEnacted in full, which constitutional provision is manda-
tory and not merely directory. 25  (3) The title is too restrictive
for the body of the act. Section 11 of the act provides:
"In case any person shall fail or refuse to obey any summons
or subpoena issued by said court after due service then, and
in that event said court is hereby authorized and empowered to
take proper proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction
to compel obedience to such summons or subpoena."
This section which greatly enlarges the jurisdiction of the
courts does not appear in the title of the act creating a court of
industrial relations, defining its powers and relating thereto. Vari-
ous cases have been decided by the supreme court of Kansas
holding acts of the legislature void because the titles are too
restricted for the subjects included in the body of the acts.26 (4)
The new crime of hindering or delaying the continuity of pro-
duction of certain industries, employments, public utilities and
the operation of common carriers is created with no reference to
the criminal code of procedure and is not germane to the title.
27
(5) The body of the act attempts to change the power, authority
and jurisdiction 2s of the supreme court with no indication in the
utilities and common carriers as defined by the Kansas statutes; all laws
relating to the powers, authority, jurisdiction and duties of the public
utilities commission are adopted and made applicable to the court, and
the commission is abolished. The court is required to prosecute or de-
fend all pending actions brought by or against the commission, and any
investigations, examinations or proceedings pending before the commis-
sion are to be continued and heard by the court.25Commissioners of Sedgwick County v. Bailey, (1874) 13 Kan. 600.
26See Allen County Agr. Soc. v. County Commissioners, (1915) 93
Kan. 772, 145 Pac. 902; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Commissioners of Wa-
baunsee County, (1891) 45 Kan. 731, 26 Pac. 483.27State v. Lewin, (1894) 53 Kan. 679, 37 Pac. 168.28Laws 1920, c. 29, Sec. 12: "In case of the failure or refusal of
either party to said controversy to obey and be governed by the order of
said court of industrial relations, then and in that even said court is
hereby authorized to bring proper proceedings in the supreme court of
the state of Kansas to compel compliance with said order; and in case
either party to said controversy should feel aggrieved at any order made
and entered by said court of industrial relations, such party is hereby
authorized and empowered within ten days after service of such order
upon it to bring proper proceedings in the supreme court of the state of
Kansas to compel said court of industrial relations to make and enter ajust, reasonable and lawful order in the premises. In case of such pro-
ceedings in the supreme court by either party, the evidence produced
before said court of industrial relations may be considered by said
supreme court, but said supreme court, if it deem further evidence neces-
sary to enable it to render a just and proper judgment, may admit such
additional evidence in open court or order it taken and transcribed by a
master or commissioner. . ..
45
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title of the act, even granting that the legislature has the power
to make the changes.
The supreme court adverted to most of the points raised in
the brief of counsel for Howat and held that the court of indus-
trial relations is not a court in the strict judicial sense and pointed
out that the act creates an administrative board to carry out the
will of the legislature and cited cases to show that the word
"court" is frequently applied to bodies not strictly judicial in
character.2 9  Touching the objections that the act undertakes to
confer all the power of the public utilities commission upon the
new court without reEnacting in full the sections of the old
law, the court decided that the act is not amendatory and that
art. 2, sec. 16 does not prohibit legislation by reference, citing
with approval State v. Shawnee County,30 wherein the court
announced that it is constitutional to extend the provisions of
an existing statute to a new subject by an appropriate reference
to such statute in the new act; that the legislature has power to
declare the meaning of an earlier act and such interpretation is
binding in all cases arising after it has been made manifest; and
that reference and interpretative statutes are not amendatory
within the meaning of the constitution. Discussing the power
of courts of competent jurisdiction to compel the attendance
of witnesses before the court of industrial relations as being
foreign to the title, the court remarked that the title includes the
words "An act creating a court of industrial relations . . .
and relating thereto;" that sec. 11 certainly has relation to the
new tribunal and is therefore, pertinent to the subject expressed
in the title. The objections that the title is too restrictive, the
court dismissed with the curt statement: "We think them not
well taken."
Since one of the chief objections to the act has been directed
against the title, revival, etc., a brief statement on the general
constitutional position of these matters may be introduced at
this place. -Legislative procedure in this country was adopted
from England. Certain forms for bills in parliament developed,
but inaccuracy in form never rendered a statute invalid. Custom
and law in England have been the chief regulators, but custom
29See "Words and Phrases," "Courts;" Aldrich v. Aldrich, (1844) 8
Metc. 102. The legislature of Massachusetts is styled "The General
Court of Massachusetts," Const. c. I, Art. I.30(1910) 83 Kan. 199, 110 Pac. 92.
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and statutory laws are not binding on parliament. Originally,
all the acts of a parliamentary session had one caption or title,
but a distinct title for each chapter was introduced by Henry
VIII.31 Originally, the parliament petitioned the king to legis-
late and the title served to notify him of the desired legislation.
When parliament ceased petitioning for legislation and drafted
bills in complete form in order to hold the king to the exact
wishes of parliament, titles assumed a slightly increased impor-
tance but were still relatively unimportant because the attention
of the legislator was directed to the content of the bill, not by its
title, but by the rule that required three readings; besides, many
of the members were illiterate and could read neither the title
nor the bill. With the increase in the number and complexity
of bills the title assumed more importance because members paid
slight attention to the perfunctory reading of the bills and read
for themselves the bills whose titles aroused their interest. A
body of skilled bill drafters now see that all important govern-
ment bills have a correct form, for a defective or misleading title
might mean the defeat of the cabine,.
There were many grave abuses in legislation in the United
States before the adoption of constitutional restrictions in regard
to title, unity, revival by amendments, reference, etc. One of
the strong arguments for placing such matters in the constitu-
tion is that by so doing, they become enforceable by the courts;
therefore, if the titles do not fit the requirements of the consti-
tution, the act, or at least parts of it, may be declared unconsti-
tutional and void. Before titles of acts were regulated by con-
stitutional provisions, a notorious abuse occurred in the state
of Georgia in the Yazoo act of Jan. 17, 1795. The legislature
passed an act with the following title: "An act for the payment
of the late state troops." When the act was finally passed, it was
found that large areas of land had been conferred in fee simple,
upon a few individuals. This brazen act aroused such a storm
of protest that the next legislature annulled the grant, and as a
direct result of popular indignation, a clause was inserted in the
constituticn of Georgia in 1798 which reads as follows: "Nor
shall any law or ordinance pass containing any matter different
from what is expressed in the title thereof. '3 2  This provision
31See Jones, Chester Lloyd, Statute Law Making, p. 62; Ex parte
John Lidell, (1892) 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251.
32Const. of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. 17; Savannah v. State, (1843) 4 Ga.
26.
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looked toward preventing the passage of poor bills under good
titles.
Another requirement soon found its way into the state con-
stitutions, viz. unity, or that one subject only should be treated
in each bill. This is to prevent "log rolling" and "riders" and
to make each measure stand on its own merits. The provision
requiring unity appeared in the constitution of New Jersey in
1844 and the object is "to avoid improper influences which may
result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as
have no proper relation to each other."
Title rules have met with general approval. In Congress the
rule is statutory and applies to bills making appropriations. An
act of August 26, 1842, provides ;33 "The style and title of all
acts making appropriation for the support of the government shall
be as follows: 'An act making appropriations (insert object) for
the year ending June 30 (insert year)'." Practically all the
states have regulated the matter in their constitutions.
34
There is no general agreement among the state courts on the
interpretation of title requirements in the constitution touching
construction, limits as to broadness or narrowness, sufficiency,
mandatory or directory and partial invalidity of the act. A sound
list of guiding principles was anounced by Justice Valentine
of the Kansas supreme court in State v. Barrett.35 Discussing
the matter of the title of a bill in relation to the body of the
act he said:
"Its object must be taken into consideration; and the pro-
vision must not be construed or enforced in any narrow or tech-
nical spirit, but must be construed liberally on the one side, so
as to guard against the abuse intended to be prevented by it,
and liberally on the other side, so as not to embarrass or obstruct
needed legislation. . . . The title of an act may be so
broad and comprehensive as to include innumerable minor sub-
jects, provided all these minor subjects are capable of being so
combined and united as to form only one grand and comprehen-
sive subject; or it may be so narrow and restricted as to include
only the smallest and minutest subject.. . . In construing
the title to an act, as well as the act itself, reference must be
had to the object of the act, and to the evil sought to be remedied
by it. . . . It is not necessary that the title to an act should
335 Stat. at L., C. 207, Sec. 2, p. 537.34For a good discussion of the advantages of such rules see Somer-
set County Com'rs. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., (1908) 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl.
462; Smith v. Commonwealth, (1871) 71 Ky. 100.
35(1882) 27 Kan. 213.
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be a synopsis or abstract of the entire act in all its details; it is
sufficient if the title indicates clearly, though in general terms,
the scope of the act. .... It is sufficient if it is germane to
the single subject expressed in the title, and included therein,
provided the act itself does not contain more than this single
subject."
The reason for incorporating in the state constitution such a
provision as "No law shall be revived or amended unless the new
act contain the entire act revived, or the section or sections
amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed"
is to give complete publicity to the law. Discussing a similar
provision of the New York constitution, the court of appeals in
New York said :86
"The evil in view in adopting this provision of the constitu-
tion was the incorporating into acts of the legislature by refer-
ence to other statutes, of clauses and provisions of which the
legislature might be ignorant and which affecting public and
private interest in a manner and to be extent not disclosed upon
the face of the act, a bill might become a law, which would not
receive the sanction of the legislature if fully understood ...
There is no evil . . . to be apprehended by the mere refer-
ence to other acts and statutes for the forms of process and pro-
cedure for giving effect to a statute otherwise perfect and com-
plete."
The courts usually construe these provisions liberally, not
always carrying them out in literal strictness, but generally
enforcing the original intention of the framers of the constitu-
tions.37
Reverting to the two recent cases decided by the Kansas
courts, one or two observations may be made. The supreme court
upheld the act creating a court of industrial relations as com-
plying with the formal constitutional requirements so far as it
was necessary to decide whether the Crawford County court
could compel Howat to testify before the court of industrial
relations or be adjudged in contempt and committed to jail until
he should testify. It put the stamp of approval upon legislation
by reference. Little can be said in favor of this form of legis-
lation save that it prevents padding the statute books. It does
not make for publicity of the law, either for the legislator or the
36People ex rel. Board of Comrs. of Washington Park v. Banks,(1876) 67 N. Y. 568. See State v. McNeal, (1886) 48 N. J. L. 407, 5
Atl. 805.
37See In re Buffalo Traction Co., (1898) 25 App. Div. 447, 49 N. Y.
S. 1052; People v. McKay, (1902) 72 App. Div. 527, 76 N. Y. S. 600; Ken-
nedy v. Borough of Belmar, (1897) 61 N. J. L. 20, 38 Atl. 756.
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public, and is very undesirable when combining civil and crim-
inal matters. The Wyandotte County court, by Justice McCam-
ish, had a more difficult point to decide in the Jerry Scott case.
The decision followed the rather technical decisions of the Kan-
sas supreme court's former adjudications. Justice McCamish
kept within the strict letter of the law but he neither took account
of the general legal principles stated by Justice Valentine in
State v. Barrett, nor the whole purpose and spirit of the act creat-
ing the court of industrial relations as gathered from the con-
text. The decision of the supreme court in the Howat case
surely indicates that Justice McCamish's decision will be reversed,
but in doing so, the supreme court must overrule a long line of
its own former decisions or distinguish them upon very narrow
and technical grounds.
3. Commingling the Functions of the Three Great Departments
of the Government. The framers of American constitutions both
federal and state have been influenced by the doctrine38 of Mon-
tesquieu who said: "There can be no liberty . . . if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." This theory amounts almost to a fetish. No person in
this country is regarded as qualified to be a member of a constitu-
tional convention who does not believe that the essential powers
of government should be distributed among three separate bodies
of magistrates, viz: legislative, executive and judicial. There is
no express provision in the Kansas constitution39 separating the
powers or stating that persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to the one shall not exercise any functions
properly belonging to either of the others; yet the supreme court
of Kansas in the case of In re Sims Petitioner,40 said:
"We think, however, that under our constitution these powers
are as clearly separated as though the framers of the constitu-
tion had said so in terms ;" and in "Auditor of State v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company,41 that attempting to con-
fer both executive and judicial power upon a court is "as dan-
gerous to good government as it is subversive of the constitu-
38See James Madison in No. 47 of The Federalist; constitution of
Massachusetts, Part The First, Art. XXX.
39The three great powers are vested in the Kansas constitution in
art. 1, sec. 1 ; art. 2, sec. 1; art. 3, sec. 1.
40(1894) 54 Kan. 1, 37 Pac. 135.
41(1870) 6 Kan. 500, 7 Am. Rep. 575.
INDUSTRIAL COURTS
tion which has carefully kept separate the executive, legislative
and judicial departments of the government."
Does the act creating a court of industrial relations violate the
Kansas constitution by commingling the functions of the three
great departments of government? In approaching an answer to
the question it is well to keep in mind that the framers of the
bill must have studiously attempted to avoid the mistakes made
by the legislature that enacted the "Visitation Act" which was
declared unconstitutional by the Kansas supreme court in the
case of State v. Johnson.42 This act set up a real court endowed
with complete law and equity powers; with a full set of admin-
istrative machinery of a regular court; with power to summon
juries, issue writs of mandamus and injunction; with power to
punish for contempt and to carry its decrees into effect. In
addition to these judicial powers the court had the power to
establish freight rates and switching charges, to apportion
charges between connecting carriers, and to require the construc-
tion and maintenance of depots. The court in declaring an act
with these provisions unconstitutional said:
"Despotism begins when the executive, legislative and judicial
departments of government cease to be independent of one
another and the tyrant exercises without check the powers of the
three united."
What kind of a body is created with the title, "Court of
Industrial Relations"? The act uses such words as "tribunal,"
"judges," "jurisdiction," "actions," "record,". "rules," "evidence,"
"testimony," "seal," "summons," "subpoena," "attendance of
witnesses," etc. These expressions fall within the nomenclature
of the judiciary; but is a court in the judicial sense created by
the act ? The debate43 in the legislature at the time the bill was
under consideration indicates that the lawmakers wished to create
an agency that would consider controversies between capital and
labor in such manner as to guarantee to capital a fair return; to
labor fair wages, reasonable hours and wholesome working con-
ditions; and to the public continuous and efficient service; that
the subjects coming within the powers of the body are so far-
reaching that something more than an arbitration board or a
commission in the ordinary sense of the term should be provided;
that the agency created should act in a quasi judicial capacity,
42(1900) 61 Kan. 803, 60 Pac. 1068, 49 L. R. A. 662.
43See Young, J. S. in 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, 483.
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or approach its work in a judicial frame of mind, take evidence,
make findings of fact and enter an order-in short, a court in a
broad and general but not in a technical sense. The Kansas
supreme court in the Howat case held that the agency creaied is
not a court in the judicial sense but is an administrative board
to carry out the will of the legislature.44
The next question that arises is this: Has the legislature made
an unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power to an
administrative board called the court of industrial relations?
As early as 1871 the Kansas supreme court in the case of Cole-
inan v. Newby,45 by Justice Valentine said:
"While the legislature possesses all the legislative power of
the state, and while it is true that they cannot delegate any portion
of that power to any other body, tribunal or person, yet it is
generally found impracticable for them to exercise this power
in detail. They may do so if they chose, or they may enact gen-
eral provisions, and leave those who are to act under these general
provisions to use their discretion in filling up the details. They
may mark out the great outlines, and leave those who are to act
within these outlines to use their discretion in carrying out the
minor regulations."
The supreme court of the United States in Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co.46 said:
"Such a commission is merely an administrative board created
by the state for carrying into effect the will of the state as ex-
pressed by its legislature."
In State v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad47 the Kansas supreme
court by Mr. Justice Porter said:
"In a majority of the states of the Union the legislatures have
created commissions and conferred upon them the power to reg-
ulate and control the operation of common carriers, to fix rates
and schedules for the transportation of passengers and freight,
to hear and determine complaints of the people against the carrier
and to act thereon, and the power to create such agencies and
to confer upon them these powers, has been repeatedly recognized
and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States."
The supreme court of Indiana in the case of Blue v. Beach,4 8
said:
"The test and distinction whether a power is strictly legis-
lative, or whether it is administrative, and merely relates to the
44Supra p. 46 and footnote 29.
45(1871) 7 Kan. 82.
46(1894) 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. Ed. 1014, 14 S. C. R. 1047.
47(1907) 76 Kan. 467, 92 Pac. 606.
48(1900) 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89.
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execution of the statute law is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion of what
it shall be, and conferring authority and discretion as to its exe-
cution to be exercised under and in pursuance of law. The first
cannot be done. To the latter, no valid objection can be made."
The supreme court of Oregon having under consideration
the constitutionality of an act creating a railroad commission,
in the case of State u. Corvalis" by Justice Moore said:
"The rule is universal that a legislative assembly exercising
an authority conferred by the constitution cannot delegate the
power to enact laws. It can, however, direct that the application
of a.statute to a designated district or to a specific state of facts,
shall depend upon the existence of certain conditions, to be
ascertained and determined in a particular manner."
The supreme court of Minnesota in State u. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paid Ry. Co., 0 has said:
"The principle is repeatedly recognized by all courts that the
legislature may authorize others to do things which it might
properly do itself. . . . The statute books are full of legisla-
tion granting to officers large discretionary powers in the execu-
tion of laws the validity of which has never been successfully
assailed."
The supreme court of Pennsylvania in the case of Moers v.
Reading5 ' has said:
"Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative form,
depending upon the discretion of some person or persons to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the occasion exists
for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of
such discretion is the making of law."
The supreme court of Pennsylvania in Locke's Appeal5 2 said:
"To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made
to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is
found relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know. The legislature cannot
delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to dele-
gate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make its own action depend.
To deny this would stop the wheels of government."
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the con-
stitutionality of congressional acts delegating to the secretary 3
49(1911) 59 Oregon 450, 117 Pac. 980.
0 (1888) 38 Minn. 295, 37 N. W. 782.
51(1853) 21 Pa. St. 188.52(1873) 72 Pa. St. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716.55Dunlap v. U. S. (1899) 173 U. S. 65, 43 L. Ed. 616, 19 S. C. R. 319.
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of the treasury and to the president5 4 the power to ascertain facts,
and prescribe regulations under which its acts shall operate.
The legal principle established by these decisions is that the
legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws, but can
create an agency to carry out the legislative will as expressed in
the acts of the legislature. Social and economic conditions are
so complex and the demand for legislation so great, the state legis-
latures meet so infrequently and for so short a time that legisla-
tion is passed in general terms and the full operation of the law
is made to depend upon future contingencies and the determina-
tion of certain sets of facts. This determination of facts is placed
in the hands of so-called experts-either a single officer or a board.
The legislative act sets the standard and all that these officers
do is apply the standard to certain determined facts. The legis-
lature in the act creating a court of industrial relations sets the
standard in the oft-recurring phrase "fair, reasonable and just."
When the court of industrial relations determines what is "fair,
reasonable and just" it is not exercising legislative power-it is
merely applying the legislative standard of fairness, reasonable-
ness and justness to a given state of facts, which it, on investiga-
tion, finds to exist and when it enters an order the legislative will
already declared in the act becomes operative; the court of indus-
trial relations therefore, does not exercise delegated legislative
power and is a constitutional agency.
Counsel for defendant in the Howat case contended 5 that
the act (sec. 3) sets out the different employments, iidustries,
etc., in such a vague general way that the court of industrial
relations in contrast with the railroad commissions, which have
their jurisdiction specifically designated, must and does exercise
a judicial function in deciding its own jurisdiction; (2) that since
the court of industrial relations may not modify a contract that
is fair, just and reasonable, it must and does exercise a judicial
function in determining this matter.
In reply to the first objection made by counsel for Howat it
may be said that the act is as definite as the circumstances war-
rant, because the court of industrial relations has to do with
controversies over the operation of several things, viz: (1) manu-
facture or preparation of food products; (2) manufacture of
clothing; (3) mining or production of fuel; (4) transportation;
54Field v. Clark, (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294, 12 S. C. R. 495.55Brief of Mr. R. S. Brennan, p. 17.
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(5) public utilities and common carriers. The act is more
inclusive than one dealing with a subject such as railroads. The
second objection made by counsel may be answered by saying
that the court of industrial relations is not exercising a judicial
function when it decides that a subject coming within its juris-
diction is or is not fair, just and reasonable, because this is the
standard set by the legislatures, and the court of industrial re-
lations is simply exercising its executive discretion in the matter.
The supreme court of Kansas in State v. Railway Co.56 by Justice
Porter has said:
"It is not every act which requires the exercise of judgment
and discretion which can be said to be judicial. Where judgment
or discretion is exercised as a mere incident to a ministerial
power it has never been held to be the exercise of judicial power
within the meaning of constitutions, which, like ours, provide
for the separation of the three departments of government."
As additional evidence that the court of industrial relations
is not a part of the judiciary the act (sec. 11) empowers the
court to issue summons and subpoenas and can compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of books, corre-
spondence, files and accounts, but on refusal of any person to
comply, the court of industrial relations has no power to adjudge
him in contempt of court and punish him but must invoke the
aid of a court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, when the
court of industrial relations enters an order, it has no authority
to enforce obedience but must resort to the supreme court of the
state for assistance (sec. 12). Therefore, it is safe to conclude
that the court of industrial relations does not exercise judicial
power in the constitutional sense.
Does the fact that the court of industrial relations must in-
voke the assistance of real courts render the act or this part of it
unconstitutional by violating the principle of the separation of
powers? Section 11 of the act creating the court of industrial
relations is as follows:
"In case any person shall fail or refuse to obey any summons
or subpoena issued by said court after due service, then and in
that event said court is hereby authorized and empowered to
take proper proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction
to compel obedience to such summons or subpoena."
The constitutionality of a similar provision in the act of Con-
gress creating the Interstate Commerce Commission was chal-
5 (1907) 76 Kan. 467, 92 Pac. 606.
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lenged by counsel for defendant in Interstate Commerce Com-
nission v. Brimson5j 7 on the ground that the action of the court in
requiring a witness to appear before an administrative body is a
non-judicial action. The court by Justice Harlan in overruling
the contention said:
"The inquiry whether a witness -before the Commission is
bound to answer a particular question propounded to him, or to
produce books, papers, etc., in his possession and called for by
that body, is one that cannot be committed to a subordinate
administrative tribunal for final determination. . . . The per-
formance of the duty . . . which rests upon the defendants
cannot be directly enforced except by judicial process. . . . It
is none the less the judgment of a judicial tribunal dealing with
questions judicial in their nature, and presented in the customary
forms of judicial proceedings, because its effect may aid an
administrative or executive body in the performance of duties
legally imposed upon it by Congress in execution of a power
granted by the constitution."
Counsel for defendants in the Howat case argued that sec.
12 of the act 5s is invalid because it authorizes proceedings in the
supreme court; (1) to enforce compliance with the orders of the
court of industrial relations; (2) to compel the court of. industrial
relations under certain circumstances to render "just, reasonable
and lawful orders." In both instances new evidence may be
admitted by the supreme court. It was claimed that the first is
an attempt to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court; the second to confer legislative power on the supreme
court. To support the contention that the act authorizing the
supreme court to consider new evidence to enable it to render
a just and proper judgment is unconstitutional, counsel cites the
case of In re Burnette5 0 which defines a case de novo as being in
essence original. In this case the court said:
"The manner in which the case reaches the higher court is not
the test; jurisdiction being the power to hear and.determine, the
nature of the functions to be exercised controls, whether they
are to be brought into activity by primary processes or by removal
from an inferior tribunal. Upon a trial de novo the power of an
appellate court in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in
the application of the law, and in the rendition of judgment
according to the rights of the case, all independent of the action
of the lower court, is no different from what it would be if the
case were begun there originally, and hence is not appellate
57(1894) 154 U. S. 447, 39 L. Ed..49.
58For the provisions of See. 12 see footnote 28. Supra.
59 (1906) 73 Kan. 609, 85 Pac. 575.
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within the meaning of laws creating jurisdiction . . . it is
beyond the power of the legislature to enlarge the scope of the
original jurisdiction to which this court is confined, either directly
or by authorizing the primary consideration of causes othe'r than
those specified in the constitution or indirectly, by including such
cases within its review power on appeal."
In the opinion of the writer, the "proper proceeding" of see.
12 comes within the supreme court's original jurisdiction in
mandamus, and if so, it is constitutional and does not attempt to
enlarge the original jurisdiction of the court by means of a trial
de novo. Of course, any attempt of the legislature to enlarge
the original jurisdiction of the supreme court would be clearly
unconstitutional.60
The second contention that the supreme court has legislative
power conferred upon it by section 12 which authorizes either
aggrieved party because of an order of the court of industrial
relations to bring proper proceedings in the supreme court to
compel the court of industrial relations to make and enter a
"just, reasonable and lawful order" in the premises, presents a
difficult question, especially, in view of the fact that new evidence
may be admitted by the supreme court to enable it to render a
just and proper judgment. The language of section 12 is capable
of at least three constructions. If the supreme court is not satis-
fied with the original order: (1) the supreme court may determine
that the order of the court of industrial relations is not "just,
reasonable and lawful' and order it to try again and enter an-
other order which will conform to the legislative standard; (2)
it may determine what is a "just, reasonable and lawful" order
by revision and order the court of industrial relations to enforce
what in effect, is not the order of the court of industrial relations
but is the order of the supreme court; (3) it may determine
what is a "just, reasonable and lawful" order on the basis of
the new evidence and thus practically oust or supersede the court
of industrial relations. In the brief (p. 20) for the defendant
in-the Howat case, Mr. Redmond S. Brennan said:
"We assume that the section intends that the supreme court
shall set out in detail the specific orders which the court of
industrial relations is required to make. The controversy which
has thus been brought to the supreme court is the same as that
which was before the court of industrial relations. It will come
OOSee Auditor of State v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1870) 6 Kan. 500;
State ex rel. v. Wilson, (1883) 30 Kan. 661, 2 Pac. 828; Marbury v.
Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to the supreme court with the same issues framed. The same
relief will be prayed and the nature of the order which the su-
preme court will make is the same as that which was entered by
the cotirt of industrial relations. If, therefore, the order of the
court of industrial relations is a legislative order, then the order
of the supreme court is likewise legislative. The. mere fact that
in the last analysis it is the court of industrial relations that finally
enters the order does not in any way change the situation. If
the supreme court has no power to enter the order directly, then
the law will not permit it to enter such an order indirectly."
The brief cites two leading federal cases to support the con-
tention that the supreme court of Kansas' cannot revise the
orders of the court of industrial relations, also, that the legislature
in section 12 attempted to confer legislative power on the supreme
court. In the case of Interstate Comirqce Commission v. Lake-
shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co.6 the federal circuit
court for the northern district of Ohio by Justice Wing said:
"It has been urged in behalf of the commission that the court
has general equity powers in this cause to make such mandatory
injunction, other than the enforcement of the order of the com-
mission, as will satisfy justice. The act itself confines the action
of this court to the enforcement of the lawful orders or require-
ments of the interstate commerce commission. It has been fre-
quently decided in the federal courts that, under the act, the
function of the court is to enforce or refuse to enforce the order
of the commission as made; that the court cannot amend or
modify an order, or make another order; that the federal court
has no revisory power over the orders of the commission; and
that it cannot undertake to decide whether the requirements have
violated an order which the commission might have lawfully
made."
Another leading case touching the same point is St. Louis
S. W. Railway Co. v. United States,6 2 wherein the federal district
court for the western district of Kentucky said:
"At the threshold it may be said that the scope of our inquiry
is exceedingly limited and involves only the ultimate question as
to whether the commission, in the order complained of, acted
within its power. Whatever view the court might entertain upon
it, or upon the expediency or wisdom of the order, is not material.
The court cannot interfere with the rates fixed, or practice estab-
lished by the commission, unless it is made plainly to appear that
the orders are violative of the constitution or wanting in con-
formity to statutory authority, or have been arbitrarily exercised;
and the duty of the court is to determine the sole question whether
61(1905) 134 Fed. 942.
62(1916) 234 Fed. 668.
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or not the order of the particular case is based upon substantial
evidence, heard and considered by the commission."
Mr. Brennan comes to the conclusion that the court of indus-
trial relations is not a board similar to the railway commissions
or the interstate commerce commission and cannot invoke the
supreme court in the same way as these commissions can; he also
concludes that section 12 of the act undoubtedly vests the supreme
court with legislative power which makes the act unconstitutional.
The contention of Mr. Brennan on the last point seems sound
if one accepts his construction of section 12, but there are other
possible interpretations of section 12 as indicated above. It is
a wellknown rule of statutory construction that if a statute be
capable of two or more constructions under one of which it would
be constitutional and under the other unconstitutional, the courts
will adopt the meaning consonant with constitutionality. The
supreme court of Kansas in the Howat case did not consider the
controverted points in regard to the jurisdiction of the supreme
court because it was not, in the opinion of the court, involved in
the issue but it did decide the court of industrial relations is an
administrative agency to carry out the express will of the legis-
lature. This point being judicially determined, may the supreme
court in the exercise of its judicial power be invoked as indicated
in section 12? In answering this question it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between a legislative and a judicial act. A clear state-
ment on this point was made in the Sinking Fund Cases63 by
Justice Field as follows:
"The distinction between a judicial and a legislative act is
well defined. The one determines what the law is and the other
what the rights of the parties are, with reference to transactions
already had; the other prescribes what the law shall be in future
cases arising under it."
If the court of industrial relations is similar to the railway
commissions and interstate commerce commission, some guiding
principles have already been established by both federal and state
adjudications. In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.64 the
court by Justice Brewer said:
"It is doubtless true, as a general, proposition, that the forma-
tion of a tariff of charges for the transportation by a common
carrier of persons or property is a legislative or an administrative
rather than a judicial function. . . . The courts are not author-
63(1878) 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. Ed. 516.
6(1894) 154 U. S. 362, 14 S. C. R. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014.
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ized to revise or change the body of rates imposed by a legislature
or a commission; they do not determine whether one rate is
preferable to another, or what under all circumstances would
be fair and reasonable as between the carriers and the shippers;
they do not engage in any mere administrative work; but still
there can be no doubt of their power and duty to inquire whether
a body of rates prescribed by a legislature or a commission is
unjust and unreasonable, and such as to work a practical destruc-
tion to rights of property, and if found so to be, to restrain its
operation."
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. N. 0. & T. P. R. Co.05
the court said:
"It is one thing to inquire whether the rates which have been
charged and collected are reasonable .. . that is a judicial act;
but an entirely different thing to prescribe rates which shall be
charged in the state, that is a legislative act."
Again, in the case of Norwalk Railway Company's Appeal66
the court said:
"The regulation of such charges is held to be distinctively a
legislative function which may be delegated by the legislature to
a subordinate legislative or administrative body, but if this sub-
ordinate body, or the legislature, exceeds its powers, and a person
is thereby injured in his rights of property, he may invoke the
judicial power to determine that question of legal injury; and the
reasonableness of the charges, although a question legislative in
its nature, must be reviewed by the court as necessarily incident
to the exercise of its judicial power. But if the court should
attempt to establish for the future a schedule of charges, it would
exceed the limits of judicial power; it would act as legislator in
respect to a matter as to which it must also act as judge."
The supreme court of Kansas in the case of State v. M. P. R.
Co. by Justice Porter said;
"The doctrine of the decided cases is that the inquiry by the
courts as to the reasonableness of the schedules of rates or other
regulations, either made by the legislature or through a commis-
sion, is purely a judicial inquiry, and the legislature may expressly
confer the power upon the courts."
The doctrne of these cases is that an agency such as the court
of industrial relations can carry on investigations, make findings
of facts and enter an order which must be reasonable, and that
the courts may review the order as to its reasonableness as an
incident of judicial power, but cannot revise the order as this
would be an exercise of legislative power. Section 12 is very
65(1897) 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 253.
6r6(1897) 69 Conn. 576, 37 AtI. 1087.
67(1907) 76 Kan. 467, 92 Pac. 606.
INDUSTRIAL COURTS
baffling. It is the opinion of the writer that the -Kansas legisla-
ture did not intend to confer power on the supreme court to
revise an order of the court of industrial relations as this would
be clearly unconstitutional. The supreme court can neither fix a
rate nor make an order and require the court of industrial rela-
tions to enter the same as its own order; but the supreme court
can find that the order made by the court of industrial relations
is not "just, reasonable or lawful" and issue an order requiring
the court of industrial relations to proceed to hear and determine
the matter and issue an order that is "just, reasonable and law-
ful." The final order is to be entered by the court of industrial
relations, not by the supreme court. Suppose, by way of illus-
tration, the court of industrial relations should make an order
dismissing an application and the applicant should apply to the
supreme court for a mandatory order requiring the court of
industrial relations to reinstate the proceeding and hear it, can
there be any doubt that the supreme court would be dearly within
its original jurisdiction? On the other hand, suppose the court
of industrial relations should make an unjust, unreasonable and
unlawful order and the party against whom it is made should
invoke the aid of the supreme court and ask it to issue an order
upon the court of industrial relations requiring it to make and
enter a proper order. In this case the supreme court would make
its finding that the order of the court of industrial relations was
unjust, unreasonable and unlawful, and as a consequence would
enter its order requiring the court of industrial relations to hear
the matter and render a "just, reasonable and lawful" order.
The writer is of the opinion that section 12 does not confer
legislative power on the supreme court; also that the functions of
the three great departments of government are not commingled
in the act creating a court of industrial relations.
Space limitation precludes a discussion of a few other minor
constitutional questions raised in the Howat case. The general
conclusion of the writer is that the act creating a court of indus-
trial relations does not conflict with the Kansas constitution. In
the next article the constitutionality of the police power pro-
visions of the statute will be examined.
(To be continued)
